t is a pleasure to know that at a recent congress of young European intellectuals held in Rome on the Moral Crisis of Western Democracies, Prof. Jonathan Rowland of Oxford University, author of various essays on religious fundamentalism, said in reference to the Encyclical Evangelium vitae that whoever speaks of fundamentalism with regard to the Pope probably does not know the meaning of the word. There are values which do not evolve. They are fixed points that cannot be interpreted (Democratic Culture: A Theological Response). One of these values (which cannot be lost or distorted) is certainly human life. Thus there is a need, as well as a moral and legal duty, to respect and defend the life of every human being from the very moment of conception: not only by asserting the basic right to life in generic terms but also by safeguarding this right with suitable norms, including those of a penal nature.

This value, this fixed point of personal and social ethics, which defines abortion as a grave moral disorder and condemns it as a crime, clearly appears - as John Paul II recalls by quoting abundantly from the Fathers and the Church's Magisterium - as a doctrinal and disciplinary constant in Christian Tradition. "Even scientific and philosophical discussions about the precise moment of the infusion of the spiritual soul have never given rise to any hesitation about the moral condemnation of abortion" (Evangelium vitae, n. 61). Indeed, precisely in our time when the agnostic fallacy of a freedom without truth and the consequent moral impoverishment of civil law have led in many nations (although they remain a minority) to the "acceptance of abortion in the popular mind, in behaviour and even in law itself" (Evengellum vitae, n. 58), the Second Vatican Council stressed again that "life must be protected with utmost care from the moment of conception: abortion and infanticide are abominable crimes" (Gaudium et spes, n. 51).

For its part, the universal law of the Church, which in the first centuries had already condemned abortive practices, has again established that "a person who procures successful abortion incurs an automatic (latae sententiae) excommunication" (Code of Canon Law, can. 1398; cf. Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, can. 1417). It must be said - also out of respect for juridical hermeneutics - that the Legislator has confirmed this norm not by ignoring but by taking into account the sociological fact that the abortion mentality continues to spread following a very broad legislative consultation (cf. Communicationes XIV [1984], pp. 50-51). This is all mentioned in the Encyclical (cf. n. 62), which also contains noteworthy doctrinal clarifications regarding the crime of abortion, the relevant penal sanction, and the moral and penal responsibility of those who commit the crime or are accessories to it.

The concept of abortion

As we know, the recent, ongoing discovery of highly-developed surgical and pharmaceutical abortion procedures have called into question the very concept of procured abortion. In canon law, this concept went back, as a source for can. 2350, §1 of the preceding Code of Canon Law (Codicis luds Canonici Fontes, vol. 1, 1926, p. 309), to the Apostolic Constitution Effraenatam of Sixtus V, dated 29 October 1588, which defined abortion simply as the act of procuring the "foetus immaturi eiectionem" with the resulting effect. Therefore, taking into account the canonical principle that penal laws are to be interpreted strictly, the majority of commentators considered the crime of abortion to be exclusively the procured expulsion of an immature human foetus (i.e., within the first 180 days according to many) from the mother's womb.

The need, however, to clarify this concept with respect to the new abortion techniques. and the related clarifications of moral doctrine in this area led the Pontifical Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the CIC to state in 1988 that abortion means not only "the ejection of an immature foetus" but also the "killing of the same foetus; in whatever way or at whatever time from the moment of conception it may be procured" (cf. AAS80 [1988], p. 1818). Consequently, the same Legislator who had approved this interpretation has now defined abortion as: "the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the Initial phase of his or her existence, extending from conception to birth" (Evangelium vitae, n. 50).

A concise analysis of this definition allows us to state, as regards the specific elements of the crime, that:

a) procured abortion - as distinct from spontaneous and involuntary abortion - is a true homicide, because it is the voluntary elimination of a human being, Indeed, of one "most innocent" and "weak"..., "totally entrusted to the protection and care of the woman carrying him or her in the womb" (Evengelium vitae, n. 58).

b) In addition to the deliberate or malicious nature of the act - i.e., not merely culpable for lack of proper diligence - the abortion must be direct, that is, intended as an end or a means to achieve an end: procured not, only for selfish motives but also for sometimes "serious and tragic" eugenic or social reasons, which the Encyclical certainly takes into consideration, but which "can never justify the deliberate killing of an innocent human being- (Evangeflum vitae, n. 58). No crime however is involved with indirect Abortion, which occurs as the simple collateral effect or indirect consequence of an action.

c) killing is abortive "by whatever means it is carried out", either by various surgical or mechanical procedures or by pharmaceutical products, which are all measures intended to eliminate a conceived human being in different ways.

d) the act of abortion is to be considered criminal at any moment in the developmental process, "extending from conception to birth", because at each stage (fertilized egg, embryo, foetus) it is always a question of "a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence " (Evangelium vitae, n. 58; cf. n. 60, and the documents of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith - Declaration on Procured Abortion and the Instruction Donum vitae - cited above and at the basis of the authentic Interpretation. previously mentioned).

What sanction and for whom?

The seriousness of the crime required a proportionate penal sanction to safeguard the moral integrity of the ecclesiastical community as well as the spiritual welfare of the transgressor - a latae sententiae excommunication. It is serious because it deprives one of specific rights and spiritual goods, including the reception of the sacraments, and because - since an outward but usually hidden fact is to be punished - the excommunication is imposed automatically by the law itself, i.e., at the same time as the act of procuring the abortion, always with the proviso that it was successful, effectu secuto (can. 1398), viz., that the procured killing really occurred. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the penalty is to be weighed in a spirit of respect for the person and with the kindness and mercy proper to the Church's law.

In fact, with regard to a medicinal canonical sanction:

a) its immediate goal is pastoral, i.e., the conversion of the offender, and ultimately his highest good, eternal salvation.

b) in addition to the always necessary subjective requirement that the crime be seriously imputable (cf. CIC, can. 1321, §11), legally excusing causes must be taken into account in individual cases (cf. CIC, can. 1323), including persons who are less than 16 years of age, act out of grave fear or through no fault of their own are unaware of violating a penal law; there are also many extenuating circumstances (cf. CIC, can. 1324), which in the case of automatic penalties become grounds for exemption (CIC, ibid., §3).

c) the excommunication cannot be perpetual, but is remitted by absolution once the guilty person ceases from contumacy because he of she is truly repentant (cf. CIC, can. 1347, §2).

d) since this excommunication is not reserved to the Holy See nor ordinarily declared, i.e., made public by the competent authority, the penalty can be remitted not only by the local Ordinary for his subjects, for those who are living in his territory or who committed the crime there, and by any Bishop in the act of sacramental confession (cf. CIC, can. 1355, §2), but also by the canon penitentiary or other priests authorized by the Bishop (cf. CIC, can. 508), chaplains in hospitals, prisons or on ships (cf. CIC, can. 566, §2), by any priest when there is danger of death (cf. CIC, can. 976), and indeed, by any confessor in the internal sacramental forum according to the conditions laid down by law (cf. CIC, can. 1357).-

As for the subjects, excommunication is incurred not only by the mother who consented to the abortion, but also by the author of the act itself and the co-authors, i.e., "those who collaborate to commit an offence through a common conspiracy" (CIC, can. 1329, §11), a crime of which they are all deliberately the efficient cause. Among the others, the necessary accomplices are also punished with the same penal sanction, i.e., including, according to their influence over the act those who order or instigate it, those "without whose efforts an offence would not have been committed" (CIC, can. 1329, §2). Given the variety of abortive means, of family and personal situations, of legal and health circumstances, etc., the possible degrees of culpability must be weighed in individual cases.

To avoid misunderstanding, however, it should be kept in mind that grave moral responsibility - for grave, mortal sin - can be attributed to a broader number of people than those who, according to common canonical teaching, fall under the more limited category of penal imputability. Indeed, the social and cultural horror of the abortion mentality and its policies goes beyond the moral or penal responsibility of Christians alone. "One cannot overlook", John Paul II warns, "the network of complicity which reaches out to include international institutions, foundations and associations which syst6madcally campaign for the legalization and spread of abortion in the world. In this sense abortion goes beyond the responsibility of individuals and beyond the harm done to them, and takes on a distinctly social dimension.... We are facing what can be called 'a structure of sin' which opposes human life not yet born" (Evangelium vitae, n. 59). This is a courageous denunciation, which we think gives a special prophetic note to the doctrinal and disciplinary richness of this Encyclical. The reason is that, contrary to the opinion of the apologists of moral relativism who in some nations have called the dignity of law into question, the social problem of abortion is not a denominational issue. One need only recall, among other things, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, valid for all cultures that are truly such, recognizes the right to life as a basic right to be defended.