On 10 October at the General Audience in St Peter's Square, the Pope continued his series of talks on the creation of man.
1. In the last reflection of the present cycle we reached an introductory conclusion, taken from the words of the Book of Genesis on the creation of man as male and female. We reached these words, that is, the "beginning", to which the Lord Jesus referred in his talk on the indissolubility of marriage (cf. Mt 19:3-9; Mk 10:1-12). But the conclusion at which we arrived does not yet end the series of our analyses. We must, in fact, reread the narrations of the first and second chapter of the Book of Genesis in a wider context, which will allow us to establish a series of meanings of the ancient text, to which Christ referred. Today, therefore, we will reflect on the meaning of man's original solitude.
Solitude of "man" as such
2. The starting-point of this reflection is provided for us directly by the following words of the Book of Genesis: "It is not good that man (male) should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him" (Gen 2:18). It is God-Yahweh who speaks these words. They belong to the second account of the creation of man, and so they come from the Yahwist tradition. As we already recalled before, it is significant that, as regards the Yahwist text, the account of the creation of man (male) is a separate passage (Gen 2:7), which, precedes the account of the creation of the first woman (Gen 2:21-22). It is also significant that the first man ('adam), created from "dust from the ground" is defined as a "male" ('is) only after the creation of the first woman. And so when God-Yahweh speaks the words about solitude, it is in reference to the solitude of "man" as such, and not just to that of the male (1).
It is difficult, however, merely on the basis of this fact, to go very far in drawing conclusions. Nevertheless the complete context of that solitude of which Genesis 2:18 speaks, can convince us that it is a question here of the solitude of "man" (male and female) and not just of the solitude of man the male, caused by the lack of woman. It seems, therefore, on the basis of the whole context, that this solitude has two meanings: one derived from man's very nature, that is, from his humanity (and that is evident in the account of Gen 2), and the other derived from the male-female relationship, and that is evident, in a certain way, on the basis of the first meaning. A detailed analysis of the description seems to confirm this.
3. The problem of solitude is manifested only in the context of the second account of the creation of man. The first account ignores this problem. There man is created in one act as "male and female" ("God created man in his own image... male and female he created them" Gen 1:27). The second account which, as we have already mentioned, speaks first of the creation of the man and only afterwards of the creation of the woman from the "rib" of the male, concentrates our attention on the fact that "man is alone", and that appears a fundamental anthropological problem, prior, in a certain sense, to the one raised by the fact that this man is male and female. This problem is prior not so much in the chronological sense, as in the existential sense: it is prior "by its very nature". The problem of man's solitude from the point of view of the theology of the body will also be revealed as such, if we succeed in making a thorough analysis of the second account of creation in Genesis 2.
A specific test
4. The affirmation of God-Yahweh, "it is not good that man should be alone", appears not only in the immediate context of the decision to create woman ("I will make him a helper fit for him"), but also in the wider context of reasons and circumstances, which explain more deeply the meaning of man's original solitude. The Yahwist text connects the creation of man first and foremost with the need to "till the ground" (Gen 2:5), and that would correspond, in the first account, with the vocation to subdue and have dominion over the earth (cf. Gen 1:28). Then, the second account of creation speaks of man being put in the "garden in Eden", and in this way introduces us to the state of his original happiness. Up to this moment man is the object of the creative action of God-Yahweh, who at the same time, as legislator, establishes the conditions of the first covenant with man.
Man's subjectivity is already emphasized through this. It finds a further expression when the Lord God "formed out of the ground every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them" (Gen 2:19). In this way, therefore, the first meaning of man's original solitude is defined on the basis of a specific test, or examination, which man undergoes before God (and in a certain way also before himself). By means of this test, man becomes aware of his own superiority, that is, that he cannot be considered on the same footing as any other species of living beings on the earth.
In fact, as the text says, "whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name" (Gen 2:19). "The man gave names to all cattle, and to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the field; but for the man (male) there was not found a helper fit for him" (Gen 2:20).
Creation of woman
5. All this part of the text is unquestionably a preparation for the account of the creation of woman. However, it possesses a deep meaning even apart from this creation. For created man finds himself, right from the first moment of his existence, before God as if in search of his own entity; it could be said: in search of the definition of himself. A contemporary would say: in search of his own "identity". The fact that man "is alone" in the midst of the visible world and, in particular, among living beings, has a negative significance in this search, since it expresses what he "is not". Nevertheless, the fact of not being able to identify himself essentially with the visible world of other living beings (animalia) has, at the same time, a positive aspect for this primary search: even if this fact is not yet a complete definition, it constitutes, however, one of its elements. If we accept the Aristotelian tradition in logic and in anthropology, it would be necessary to define this element as the "proximate genus" (genus proximum) (2).
6. The Yahwist text enables us, however, to discover also further elements in that admirable passage, in which man finds himself alone before God mainly to express, through a first self-definition, his own self-knowledge, as the original and fundamental manifestation of mankind. Self-knowledge develops at the same rate as knowledge of the world, of all the visible creatures, of all the living beings to which man has given a name to affirm his own dissimilarity with regard to them. In this way, therefore, consciousness reveals man as the one who possesses the cognitive faculty as regards the visible world. With this knowledge which, in a certain way, brings him out of his own being, man at the same time reveals himself to himself in all the peculiarity of his being. He is not only essentially and subjectively alone. Solitude, in fact, also signifies man's subjectivity, which is constituted through self-knowledge. Man is alone because he is "different" from the visible world, from the world of living beings. Analysing the text of the Book of Genesis we are, in a way, witnesses of how man "distinguishes himself" before God-Yahweh from the whole world of living beings (animalia) with his first act of self-consciousness, and of how, therefore, he reveals himself to himself and at the same time asserts himself as a "person" in the visible world. That process sketched so incisively in Genesis 2:19-20, a process of search for a definition of himself, leads not only to indicating—linking up with the Aristotelian tradition —the proximate genus, which in chapter 2 of Genesis is expressed with the words: "the man gave names", to which there corresponds the "specific differentia" which is, according to Aristotle's definition, noõs, zÜÙn noÂtikÙn. This process also leads to the first delineation of the human being as a human person with the specific subjectivity that characterizes him.
Let us interrupt here the analysis of the meaning of man's original solitude. We will take it up again next week.
1) The Hebrew text constantly calls the first man ha-'adam, while the term 'is ("male") is introduced only when contrasted with 'issa ("female").
So "man" was solitary without reference to sex.
In the translation into some European languages it is difficult, however, to express this concept of Genesis, because "man" and "male" are usually defined with one word: "homo", "uomo", "homme", "man".
2)"An essential (quidditive) definition is a statement which explains the essence or nature of things.
It will be essential when we can define a thing by its proximate genus and specific differentia.
The proximate genus includes within its comprehension all the essential elements of the genera above it and therefore includes all the beings that are cognate or similar in nature to the thing that is being defined; the specific differentia, on the other hand, brings in the distinctive element which separates this thing from all others of a similar nature, by showing in what manner it is different from all others, with which it might be erroneously identified.
"Man" is defined as a "rational animal"; "animal" is his proximate genus, "rational" is his specific differentia. The proximate genus "animal" includes within its comprehension all the essential elements of the genera above it, because an animal is a "sentient, living, material substance" (…) The specific differentia "rational" is the one distinctive essential element which distinguishes "man" from every other, "animal". It therefore makes him a species of his own and separates him from every other "animal" and every other genus above animal, including plants, inanimate bodies and substance.
Furthermore, since the specific differentia is the distinctive element in the essence of man, it includes all the characteristic "properties" which lie in the nature of man as man, namely, power of speech, morality etc. realities which are absent in all other beings in this physical world".
(C.N. Bittle, The Science of Correct Thinking, Logic, Milwaukee 194712, p. 73-74).
L'Osservatore Romano October 15, 1979